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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In Point I of th is reply to P l a i n t i f f ' s Brief, Defendant 
points to several instances in which Plaintiff has misappre-
hended the extent of the stipulated facts . As clarified 
here, i t becomes clear that Plaint iff properly sought payment 
from the corporation, that Plaintiff was not misled by any 
action or inaction of Defendant, and that Plaint iff simply 
erroneously assumed the corporation owned the property he 
worked on. Thus, Plaintiff is not ent i t led to recover under 
quantum meruit. 
Point II responds to P l a in t i f f ' s claim that he has proven 
al l of the elements of quantum meruit and therefor is enti t led 
to recover from Defendant on that theory. To the contrary, 
the argument shows that in fact Plaint iff has failed to satisfy 
the most c r i t i c a l element, i . e . that Defendant was unjustly 
enriched. 
P l a i n t i f f ' s argument that Utah case law permits recovery 
on quantum meruit is addressed in Point I I I . There i t is 
demonstrated that , to the contrary, the law of Utah precludes 
recovery under the stipulated facts here under consideration. 
Finally, Point IV refutes P l a i n t i f f ' s claim that this 
Court must defer to the t r i a l cour t ' s findings. Since this 
case is here on stipulated fac ts , this Court is in as good 
a position as the t r i a l court to evaluate those facts and 
apply the appropriate law. 
I. 
THE STIPULATED FACTS DO NOT SUPPORT PLAINTIFF'S CONTENTIONS 
Plaintiff is laboring under a misappreshension as to 
the extent of the stipulated facts. In his Statement of 
Facts, Mr. Knight states: "Although both the Defendant and 
the corporation knew that Plaintiff had billed the wrong 
party, neither ever informed the Plaintiff of this fact." 
(Resp. Br., p. 1.) The stipulated facts are not that the 
Plaintiff in fact billed the wrong party, but that Plaintiff 
was never advised that by billing the corporation he had 
billed the wrong party. (R. 5) The reason, of course, that 
Plaintiff was never so advised is that he was billing the 
right party. It was the corporation with which he had contracted 
(R. 4), and there would be no reason for Mr. Knight to bill 
Mr. Post personally since he had no contract with Mr. Post. 
Plaintiff confuses the fact that he wishes he had contracted 
with the property owners with the stipulated fact that he 
contracted with the corporation. 
Plaintiff compounds the error of his misapprehended 
facts when he claims that he was misled by "the silence of 
both Defendant and the corporation as to who would ultimately 
be responsible for payment." (Resp. Br., pp. 7, 8) The corporation 
was not silent and the Plaintiff was not misled. Obviously, 
having contracted with the Plaintiff to furnish the labor 
and materials (R. 4), the corporation was ultimately responsible 
for payment. And the Plaintiff understood that to be the 
case since he was instructed to bill the corporation. (R. 
5) Plaintiff leaps to the conclusion that ownership by itself 
creates an obligation to pay. It does notf except under 
the legal remedies of the mechanic's lien statutes (§§ 38-
1-1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)) and 
the owner's bond statutes (§§ 14-2-1, et seq., Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended)), of which Plaintiff failed 
to avail himself. 
Plaintiff's misapprehension of the facts is also apparent 
at page 5 of his brief. There he argues that although Defendant 
knew Plaintiff was seeking payment from the corporation, 
had filed a mechanic's lien against it's interest,* and the 
corporation had filed bankruptcy, "neither Defendant nor 
the corporation ever informed Plaintiff that it was Defendant's 
dba and not the corporation that actually owned the property 
and received the benefit of the Plaintiff's labor." Defendant 
respectfully submits that those facts make no difference. 
Plaintiff contracted with the corporation, not Defendant. 
Plaintiff does not claim that he inquired as to ownership 
of the property and was misled. Nor does he claim that any 
representations of ownership were made. Nor does he claim 
that he checked the county records and was confused by the 
* Again Plaintiff misapprehends the stipulated facts. The 
stipulated fact is that a lien was filed. (R. 7) It was 
not stipulated that either Mr. Post or the corporation knew 
of the lien. Indeed, they had no reason to know, even 
constructively, since it described the wrong land. See 
discussion, p. 7. 
similarity of the names Post Petroleum Company and Post Petroleum 
Company, Inc. If anything, he simply erroneously assumed 
that the corporation was the owner of the property. That 
assumption on his part does not constitute a "misleading'1 
act on the part of the Defendant. 
The speciousness of Plaintiff's claim that he was somehow 
confused or misled by the similarity in names is demonstrable. 
Curiouslyf Plaintiff never says how things would have come 
out differently if he had known that the corporation did 
not own the well. It could not be that he would have had 
a valid lien on Mr. Post's interest since the Notice of Lien 
he did file is patently defective. The Notice of Lien (Ex. "C," 
Add. "1" hereof) describes the well as being in "Township 1 
South, Range 1 East, U.S.B. & M. Section 9: The Roosevelt 
Unit 1-19" (emphasis added), whereas the Designation of Agent 
form (Ex. "A," Add. "2" hereof) shows that Well 1-19 is in 
the "NW% Sec. 19 T.1S, R.1E," (emphasis supplied) (It is 
customary to use such a number to designate wells within 
sections, i.e. 1-19 refers to the first well in Section 19.) 
Since Plaintiff's lien was filed in Section 9 rather than 
the correct Section 19, it was invalid even if Plaintiff 
had named the actual owners. 
Nor would things have been different for Plaintiff with 
respect to his rights under the owner's bond statutes (§ 14-2-1, 
et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)) had he known 
of Defendant's ownership interest at the outset. Plaintiff 
first learned the corporation had no interest sometime prior 
to January 10, 1983, the date on which Plaintiff filed his 
claim in the corporate bankruptcy. (R. 8,9) He had from 
then until April 26, 1983 (one year after he last performed 
work as shown by his Notice of Lien, Ex wC,n Add. wl" hereof) 
as required by § 14-2-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
Yet he failed to do so. Would he have timely filed suit 
if he had known the Status of title for one year instead 
of three and one-half months? There is nothing to suggest 
that he would have. 
Finally, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that things 
would have been different but for the similarity of names. 
He only claims confusion as to Defendants1 proprietorship, 
Post Petroleum Company, which owned only 33.75% of the well. 
He does not claim to have been confused or misled by the 
names of the other owners. Had Plaintiff really believed 
he was contracting with the owners, or even doing work for 
the owners, that belief obviously would have attached to 
all the owners, not just Mr. Post. It seems obvious that 
it was only after the fact, only after it became apparent 
that the corporation could not pay, that Plaintiff looked 
around, discovered the similarity in names, and said to himself, 
"I must have been confused or misled. I thought I was dealing 
with Mr. Post who still has money." That simply won't wash. 
II. 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PROVE ALL OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF QUANTUM MERUIT 
Defendant agrees with Plaintiff that the elements of 
quantum meruit are (1) a benefit conferred, (2) appreciation 
or knowledge of the benefit, and (3) retention of the benefit 
under circumstances which would be inequitable without payment 
of its value. (Resp. Br., pp. 3, 4, quoting from Berrett 
vs. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984)). Defendant also 
agrees that the stipulated facts establish the first two 
elements of quantum meruit—Defendant's partial ownership 
interest was benefited by Plaintiff's services and Defendant 
knew that that benefit was being conferred. However, the 
stipulated facts wholly fail to establish the third element, 
which requires a showing that Defendant is retaining the 
benefit under circumstances which make it inequitable for 
him to do so without payment to Plaintiff or, in other words, 
that he has been unjustly enriched. 
Plaintiff argues that the inequity is shown by the fact 
that Defendant knew Plaintiff was seeking payment from the 
corporation, "knew" that Plaintiff attempted to lien the 
interest of the corporation, (see footnote, p. 6), and knew 
that the corporation had filed for bankruptcy, yet did not 
inform Plaintiff that Defendant was a partial owner of the 
property benefited. (Resp. Br., p. 5) Plaintiff then notes 
that his ability to recover from the corporation has been 
hampered and leaps to the conclusion that it would be unjust 
under the circumstances for Defendant to retain the benefit 
without compensating Plaintiff. Plaintiff cites no cases 
in support of his argument. 
As has previously been demonstrated, Defendant did nothing 
to mislead Plaintiff. (Point I, supra) Plaintiff is simply 
asking this Court to correct mistakes he unilaterally made. 
He mistakenly assumed that the corporation owned the well. 
(A surprising assumption since operators of wells are often 
not the owners, and contractors usually do their business 
with the operators, not the owners.) Had he simply inquired 
of the corporation or checked the county records, he would 
have found his assumption was erroneous. He would have learned 
the actual ownership of the well in time to file a valid 
lien against not only Defendant's 33.75% interest but also 
the interests of the other owners. Having failed to make 
those simple inquiries, and the time for filing a lien against 
the ownership interest having expired. Plaintiff now asks 
this Court to afford him another remedy in addition to the 
one granted him by statute. 
Plaintiff also had a direct right of action against 
Defendant under the owner's bond statutes (§§ 14-2-1, et 
seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended)). Again, he 
failed to avail himself of this remedy within the one year 
period of limitation, even though he discovered Defendant's 
ownership interest approximately three months prior to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations.* Thus, once again 
having failed to timely exercise his rights, Plaintiff asks 
this Court to give him another chance. 
Opening Brief, it is Plaintiff's burden of showing that Defendant 
has been unjustly enriched. The stipulated facts do not 
demonstrate this necessary element for recovery and Plaintiff 
has made nothing but bald, unsupported assertions thereof 
based on erroneous assumptions. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM RECOVERY UNDER QUANTUM MERUIT 
Plaintiff quarrels with the language quoted by Defendant 
from Kershaw vs. Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Company, 561 
P.2d 683, 685 (Utah, 1977), to the effect that "clearly every 
benefit conferred is not recompensable and unjustly received." 
He claims that that language was taken out of context. (Resp. 
Br., p. 6) This Court has, however, consistently reiterated 
that principle. In Berrett vs. Stevens, supra, (cited by 
Plaintiff) it was said, "The mere fact that a person benefits 
another is not by itself sufficient to require the other 
* The work was completed April 26, 1982 (Notice of Lien, 
Exhibit "C", Add. 2), thus the statute of limitations did 
not run until April 26, 1983; Plaintiff discovered Defendant's 
ownership interest in January, 1983, after the bankruptcy 
proceedings had been filed. (R. 8, 9)) As noted in Appellant's 
to make restitution." 690 P.2d 558. And in General Leasing 
Company vs. Manivest Corporation, 667 P.2d 596 (Utah, 1983), 
(also cited by Plaintiff) it was said that, "Unjust enrichment 
does not apply to every circumstance where one has been benefited 
by another's detriment." 667 P.2d 597. 
Plaintiff contends that his services were rendered under 
the belief that he would be paid therefore. (Resp. Br., p. 6) 
Defendant agrees. However, it is respectfully submitted 
that the stipulated facts show that Plaintiff expected to 
be paid by the corporation, not this Defendant, since his 
contract was with the corporation (R. 4), he billed the corporation 
for the work (R. 5), he attempted to lien the interest of 
the corporation (R. 7), and he filed a creditor's claim against 
the corporation in the bankruptcy proceeding (R. 8). It 
was only after Plaintiff discovered that he would be unable 
to promptly collect from the corporation that he decided 
that he had really intended to deal with Defendant. 
Since the holding of Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings 
Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977), is dispositive here, 
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish it from the facts of this 
case. (Resp. Br., p. 6) At the outset it should be observed 
that there were five bases for the result in Commercial Fixtures: 
(1) the tenant had contracted away his right to charge the 
land with the value of improvements; (2) the stipulated facts 
showed no agreement, either express or implied, since the 
Plaintiff had placed no reliance on the credit of the Defendant 
and the lease agreement obl igated the l essee to pay; (3) 
there was no showing of unjust enrichment since there was 
no misleading a c t , request for serv ices or the l i k e but merely 
a f a i lu re of performance; (4) there was an express contrac t 
which precluded imposition of an implied cont rac t ; and (5) 
the P l a in t i f f fa i led to exhaust his legal remedies by f i l i n g 
a mechanic's l i en or bringing s u i t against the l e s s e e . I t 
i s r espec t fu l ly submitted that any one of those five bases 
was su f f i c i en t to deny recovery in Commercial F ix tu re s , but 
P l a i n t i f f only addresses three here . 
F i r s t , P l a i n t i f f contends t ha t Commercial F ix tures i s 
d i s t ingu i shab le because there the tenant had contracted away 
any r igh t he may have had to charge Defendant 's i n t e r e s t 
with the value of improvements or r epa i r s whereas no such 
relinquishment has occurred here . (Resp. Br. f pp. 6, 7) I t 
is t rue tha t the s t ipu la ted fac t s do not show any such re l inqu i sh -
ment. However, the s t ipu la ted fac ts a lso do not show tha t 
the corporation had any au thor i ty to encumber Defendant 's 
i n t e r e s t . 
Second, P l a i n t i f f points out tha t in Commercial F ix tures 
the p l a i n t i f f had fa i l ed to exhaust h is adminis t ra t ive remedies 
by not f i l i n g a mechanic's l i e n . (Resp. Br . , p . 7) He argues 
here tha t he attempted to f i l e a mechanic's l i en against 
the co rpora t ion ' s i n t e r e s t but that remedy has been impaired 
by the bankruptcy proceedings. The argument i s without mer i t . 
The f i l i n g of a mechanic's l i en against the co rpora t ion ' s 
i n t e r e s t was a f r u i t l e s s act a t the ou tse t s ince the corporation 
had no i n t e r e s t . The l i en would have had no ef fec t regardless 
of the bankruptcy proceedings. Plaintiff failed to record 
a lien against the owner1s interest, i.e. Defendant and his 
co-owners. Plaintiff does not contend that his failure was 
due to confusion arising from the similarity between the 
names of Defendant's proprietorship and the corporation. 
As previously noted, Plaintiff simply assumed that the corporation 
owned the property without making any adequate investigation 
thereof. And, as previously shown (supra, p. 7), the Notice 
of Lien was patently defective; it described the wrong property 
and would have been ineffective even if the actual owners 
were identified. 
Third, Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Commercial 
Fixtures by contending that there was a misleading act here 
in that the corporation and Defendant did not inform him 
of which entity would "ultimately be responsible for payment." 
(Resp. Br., pp. 7, 8) The fact of the matter is that the 
contract was with the corporation and the corporation was 
ultimately responsible for payment; Plaintiff was not misled 
since he was specifically instructed to bill the corporation. 
In attempting to distinguish Commercial Fixtures, Plaintiff 
ignores the specific holding of the Court that where there 
is an express contract, as here between Plaintiff and the 
corporation, no contract can be implied between Plaintiff 
and this Defendant. Commercial Fixtures and Furnishings, 
Inc. v. Adams, supra, at 774. Nor does Plaintiff address 
the Commercial Fixtures requirement that no implied contract 
will be found where it is not shown that the Plaintiff placed 
reliance on the credit of the Defendant. (Id.) Clearly Plaintiff 
here did not rely on Defendant's credit since he did not 
even know of his existence until nine months after the contract 
was made and performed. It cannot be said that Plaintiff 
was relying on the ownership interest as Defendant's credit 
for that would fly in the face of Commercial Fixtures, since 
there, too, the defendant had an ownership interest and the 
Court found no reliance. (Id.) 
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that this Court should abandon 
the rule enunciated by Commercial Fixtures and its predecessors 
and adopt the Tennessee rule of Paschall1sf Inc. vs. Dozier, 
407 S.W. 2d 150 (Tenn. 1966). Paschall's has not, however, 
been well received by courts of other jurisdictions. For 
instance, in Pendleton vs. Sard, 297 A.2d 889 (Me. 1972), 
the court made an indepth analysis of Paschall1s, then rejected 
that approach in favor of the Texas rule in Crockett vs. 
Sampson, 439 S.W.2d 355, (CCA. Tex., 1979). In Crockett, 
the Texas Court found that there were no circumstances under 
which the subcontractor would be led to believe that anyone 
other than the prime contractor would pay him and, therefore, 
there was no basis for recovery in quantum meruit since there 
were no inequities shown. 439 S.W.2d 355, 358. The analysis 
of the Pendleton court in applying the Crockett rule is worth 
quoting in depth: 
We cannot anticipate every factual 
situation that may arise but we conclude 
that under ordinary and usual circumstances 
the equities will not permit the supplier 
of labor and materials to obtain a personal 
judgment against the owner with whom 
he had no contractual dealings. . . . 
The prime contractor may have been paid 
in full by the owner. The subcontractor 
may not have exhausted his remedies against 
the prime contractor. The subcontractor, 
with opportunity available to test the 
credit of the prime contractor , has elected 
to give the latter credit. The owner 
may naturally assume that suppliers dealing 
with the prime contractor will look to 
the latter for payment. Defenses which 
may be available to the prime contractor 
as against the supplier may not be known 
or available to the owner. Any one or 
a combination of these equitable considera-
tions , and perhaps others raised by the 
facts, will tend to prevent any "enrichment" 
from being "unjust" and will thus militate 
against a quasi contractual obligation. 
297 A.2d 895. It is submitted that here, also, any one or 
combination of those considerations may exist. Having failed 
to prove that they do not, Plaintiff has not carried his 
burden of proving that Defendant was "unjustly enriched". 
IV. 
THIS COURT IS NOT BOUND BY THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT 
Plaintiff suggests that this Court must defer to the 
findings of the trial court because it was in a better position 
to evaluate the evidence. (Resp. Br.f pp. 9, 10) That is 
true when there has been a full trial in the lower court 
and it has heard the testimony of witnesses and assessed 
their credibility. But here there was no trial—the case 
was submitted to Judge Davidson on precisely the same facts 
as are before this Court. He was not required to decide 
which wi tnes s was more b e l i e v a b l e but on ly to apply the law 
t o the f a c t s p r e sen t ed to him. 
Thus the appeal p resen ted here i s one of law, no t of 
d i spu ted f a c t s . Where q u e s t i o n s of law a re p r e s e n t e d , " the 
same defe rence need not be accorded the lower c o u r t ' s p o s i t i o n 
as [would be accorded] f i n d i n g s of f a c t . Provo C i t y Corp. v s . 
Nie lson S c o t t Company, I n c . y 603 P.2d 803, 804 (Utah, 1979) 
This Court i s a t f u l l l i b e r t y t o make i t s own d e c i s i o n , r e g a r d -
l e s s of the r u l i n g below. 
CONCLUSION 
I t i s r e s p e c t f u l l y submit ted t h a t P l a i n t i f f has f a i l e d 
to e s t a b l i s h h i s r i g h t to recover from Defendant . He has 
not shown t h a t Defendant has been u n j u s t l y e n r i c h e d . The 
T r i a l C o u r t ' s Rul ing and Judgment should be r eve r sed and 
the case should be remanded with i n s t r u c t i o n s t o e n t e r judgment 
i n favor of Defendant , no cause of a c t i o n , and Defendant 
should be awarded h i s c o s t s . 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, t h i s ^ 6 day of August , 1985. 
PRUITT, GUSHEE & FLETCHER 
F. Alan F l e t c h e r 




Notice of Lien (Ex. nC") 1 
Designation of Agent (Ex. "A") 2 
P . O . F o x 2 4 6 
F o o L L V i - l t . U t a h E 4 0 C 6 
o \I 
-3 ^ 
-. o c» 
*- O « 
HI 
2XrV 
h'OTICE OF LIEN 
The undersigned WTLL1AM STAFFORD KNICHT, as owner of STANCO 
INSULATION SERVICE 
Hereby gives notice of intention to hold and claim a lien upon 
the property and improvements thereon owned and reputed to he 
owned by POST PETROLEUM CO., INC., as lessee or operator of the 
mineral rights and located in Uintah County, Utah, n. ore partif.u3.iily 
described as f o l l o w s : 
TOWNSHIP 1. SOUTH, KAKCE'l EAST, U.S.B.6M. 
Sertion 9; Thf> Roosevelt Unit -1-19 
The amount demanded hereby is $18,437.13 owing to the ,'unders 5 gn rd for 
furnishing materials used in performing labor upon the construction 
improvement upon the above described property, to w i t.':/ iriVu! a t i ng 
an oil well battery and erection of 2 buildings. -. '/•'•.,''»" A 
* \ . *• • * ' " \ ' • fit •' 
The undersigned furnished said materials to was employed by 
POST PETROLEUM C O . , I N C . , who was the operator, such being done 
by the *undersigned under a contract "made' between POST PETROLEUM CO. 
inc. and the undersigned by the terras and conditions of which 
the undersigned did agree to Pay cash when the contract was performed, 
or net within 30 days after completion in consideration of payment 
to the undersigned therefore as follows: 
Insulated battery built 2 buildings and furnished materials for 
the same . , 
and under wich contract the first material was furnished labor \^as 
performed on the 18th day of March, 1982 and the las^was so 
i . -. 
furnished or performed on the 26th day of A p r i l ; 1 9 8 2 , and for all 
of which materials labor the undersigned became entitled to 
$18,437.13, which is the reasonable value thereof, and on which pay-
payments have been made and credits and offsets allowed amounting 
to $ 0 leaving a balance owing to the undersigned of $18,437.13 
after deducting all just credits and offsets, and for which demand 
the undersigned holds and claims a lien by virtue of the "provisions 
of Chapter l t Title 3 8 , Utah Code annotated 1953. 
EXHIBIT C-
STANCO T),SULATIOK SERVICE, 
^ ^ ^ 
S u p e r v i s o r , O i l r.nd Cns O p e r a t i o n s : 
The u n d e r s i g n e d i s , on t h e r r c o r d s of t h e C e o l o g l c a l S u r v e y , 
U n i t O p e r a t o r u n d e r t h e D 6. J O i l C o . ___ __ u n i t ^ r c c r . e n t , 
( s t a t e ) , JJInJ^ah _ 
I - S e c . No. 886 




t p p r o v e c 
Utnh 
LJ4)J6O7J5JL and 
NAME: Post Petroleum Co;r,p4<ny, Inc. 
George P. Post 
ADDRESS: 15 Vo. Robinson Suite 1000 Colcoid building 
O.l;iho:ra City, OK 73102 
as it's agent, with full authority to act in its behalf .in complying with 
the terms of the (Jnit Agreement ;nd regulations applicable thereto and on 
vhom the supeivisor or his representative LJ.y serve written cr oral Instruc-
tions s'n securing co.T.pliarce with the Oil and Czs Operating Regulations 
vith respect to drilling, testing, and c^rr.pl n ting unit veil No. 1~*J? _t 
in the % JJW ^ Sec* 19 t^ T. Jjc; ,^ R. _jj7_, "___ T 
JJ^ Of-PlL County, JIlaJL 
•t is understood that this designation of agent does not relieve 
the Unit Opt ^a tor of responsibility for compliance with the terms of the 
unit agreement and the Oil and Gzs Operating Regulations. It is also 
understood that this designation of agent does not constitute an assign-
ment of any interest under the unit agreement or any lease committed 
thereto. 
In case of default oa the part of the designated agent, the 
Unit Operator will make full and prompt compliance vi th all regulations, 
lease terms, or orders of the Secretary of the Interior or his representa-
tive. 
The Unit Operator agrees promptly to notify the oil and gas 
supervisor of any change in the designated agent. 
This designation of agent is deemed to be temporary and In no 








This designation is given only to enable the agent herein 
d to drill the shove-specified unit yell. Unless rcon*r ter-
this designation shall terminate vhen there is filed in the 
te district office o£^the U. S# Geological Survey a completed 
11 required Federal* r^ epoirts pertaining to subject veil. It is 
rstood that this designation of agent is limited to field 
s and* does' not cover administrative actions rehiring specific 
tlon of the Unit Operator. 
o' <^ -<^C O .ays h\/f>~ru<\ I t s A t t o 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on t h i s 26th day of Augus t , 1 9 8 5 , 
I m a i l e d , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , four (4) c o p i e s of the f o r e g o i n g 
A p p e l l a n t ' s Reply B r i e f t o : 
John R. Anderson 
BEASLIN, NYGAARD, COKE & VINCENT 
185 North Vernal Avenue 
V e r n a l , Utah 84078-2196 
F< Alan F l e t c h e r 
